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Non-Technical Summary
In striking contrast to the intense theoretical debate on policy innovation and
policy experimentation in decentralized systems of government, an empirical
literature on strategic interactions among local jurisdictions with regard to
policy experiments is virtually non-existent. The purpose of this paper is to
help to fill this gap and to shed light on policy innovation among jurisdictions
in a federal system, with a focus on how jurisdictions influence each other in
the discrete choice decision between competing political technologies.
The jurisdictions we are looking at are school districts in Michigan. The
evidence on strategic policy interactions is based on the participation of school
districts in the first two years of a public school choice program launched in
Michigan in 1996. Under Michigan law, beginning with the 1996-97 school
year, school districts were asked to determine whether they would admit non-
resident students at local schools. Together with a school finance scheme
paying school districts a fixed amount of state aid per student, the program
did increase competition between school districts. Participation of school
districts in the program can therefore be considered an important policy
innovation in a decentralized public sector.
The key result of the paper is that school district policies towards open
enrollment have been heavily affected by lagged decisions of neighboring dis-
tricts. Across various specifications, a one percentage point increase in the
share of previous-year adopters among neighbors is estimated to increase the
current probability of adoption by about 0.2%. There is also evidence for
asymmetric responses among districts, with non-adopters being ‘pulled’ to
participation by previous-year adopters in their geographical environment.
The results suggest that in the analysis of the diffusion of policy innovations
among local jurisdictions it is crucial to take into account strategic interaction
between the jurisdictions’ governments. Furthermore, the paper supports the
view that in federal systems the diffusion of new political technologies is stim-
ulated by horizontal interactions between jurisdictions.
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Abstract
This paper investigates how local jurisdictions in a federal system influence
each other in the adoption of policy innovations. We look at school districts in
Michigan and their participation in a public school choice program launched
in 1996. Districts’ participation decisions are modelled as simultaneous dis-
crete choice decisions using a spatial latent variable model. Strong effects are
found saying that lagged adoptions of neighbors positively affect the current
probability of participation. This finding is robust to various changes in spec-
ification. The results suggest that in federal systems the diffusion of policy
innovations is stimulated by horizontal interactions between jurisdictions.
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1 Introduction
In the public economics literature, an ongoing discussion revolves around pol-
icy innovation and policy experimentation in decentralized systems of gov-
ernment. One of the key issues in the debate is how the incentives of local
governments to experiment with new policies and the behavior of local gov-
ernments in the diffusion of policy innovations are affected by interactions
between jurisdictions. A sort of standard view is that local governments are
constantly searching for better ways to solve problems of political governance.
With several jurisdictions performing policy experiments, local governments
can learn from each other.1 Of course, it will often take some time until
outcomes of policy experiments can be assessed. Nevertheless, even in sit-
uations where no information on outcomes is available, local governments
can mutually observe each other’s actions and learn from this observation
by rational Bayesian inference on information conveyed in the behavior of
others. Hence, borrowing an argument from the literature on behavioral
convergence and social learning, one could also argue that policy experimen-
tation is spurred by reputational concerns of local governments who benefit
from following the role model of jurisdictions which have already adopted a
new policy.2 Strategic interaction between jurisdictions in policy experiment-
ing and policy innovation may also take the form of yardstick competition.
For correlated environments, Besley and Case (1995) have shown that voters
can use comparative performance evaluation of representatives to alleviate
political agency problems. Under certain conditions, yardstick competition
will promote the diffusion of new political technologies. For instance, in many
cases policy makers will prefer to run traditional policies because this requires
lower effort. Yardstick competition can provide policy makers with incentives
1Kollman, Miller, and Page (2000) provide a computational model for the ability of feder-
ated systems to solve difficult problems. For a survey on ‘laboratory federalism’, see Oates
(1999).
2See the surveys of Gale (1996) and, focussing on herd behavior at financial markets,
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003).
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to implement superior but more demanding new policies.3 Of course, less op-
timistic perspectives on policy innovation in decentralized systems of govern-
ment have also received theoretical support. For instance, Rose-Ackerman
(1980) shows that risk aversion can lead jurisdictions to abstain from pol-
icy experimentation. In a recent contribution, Strumpf (2002) elaborates on
horizontal information externalities. Policy experiments provide useful infor-
mation for all governments, and this creates an incentive for free-riding on
other jurisdictions’ experimentation efforts. However, in a related theoreti-
cal paper Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2004) show that, once career concerns
of political actors are accounted for, the traditional view that decentralized
systems of government offer favorable conditions for policy experimentation
and policy innovation is again validated.
In striking contrast to the intense theoretical debate, an empirical litera-
ture on strategic interactions among local jurisdictions with regard to policy
experiments and policy innovation is virtually non-existent. The purpose of
this paper is to help to fill this gap and to shed light on policy innovation
among jurisdictions in a federal system, with a focus on how jurisdictions
influence each other in the discrete choice decision between competing polit-
ical technologies. The jurisdictions we are looking at are school districts in
Michigan. Note that members of school boards in Michigan school districts
are determined by general elections, and that school boards have the ulti-
mate responsibility for school district operations. Hence, school districts are
independent local jurisdictions that seem to be well suited for an empirical
analysis of policy innovation in a decentralized system of government.
In this paper, the evidence on strategic policy interactions is based on the
participation of school districts in the first two years of a public school choice
program launched in Michigan in 1996. Under Michigan law, beginning with
the 1996-97 school year, school districts were asked to determine whether
3A formal model with yardstick competition between governments which have to choose
between a traditional and a new policy is presented in Rincke (2005b).
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they would admit non-resident students at local schools. Together with a
school finance scheme paying school districts a fixed amount of state aid
per student, the program did increase competition between school districts.
Participation of school districts in the program can therefore be considered
an important policy innovation in a decentralized public sector.
Districts’ participation decisions are modelled as simultaneous discrete
choice decisions using spatial latent variable models. The key result of the
paper is that in their predisposition to participate in inter-district open en-
rollment the school districts have been heavily affected by lagged decisions
of neighboring districts. This finding is robust to various changes in speci-
fication. The neighborhood influence on districts’ adoption decisions is also
present if we control for vertical interactions in the federal system. More
precisely, we account for the influence of Intermediate School Districts as
regional service agencies on district policies. This is important because in a
federal system spatial correlation in local policy innovations could be driven
by the impact higher-level authorities have on local jurisdictions.
From a methodological point of view, this paper relates to the growing
body of literature on strategic policy interaction. However, this literature
has to date almost exclusively focused on fiscal variables like tax rates, ex-
penditures and local public goods provision.4 A study more closely related
to local policy innovations is Brueckner (1998), dealing with the adoption of
growth control policies in California cities. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002)
examine environmental policymaking and find that US states are influenced
by their neighbors when adopting more or less stringent regulations. In con-
trast to this paper, where the discrete choice between competing policies is
modelled, both studies examine the stringency of regulations as continuous
dependent variables. It should also be noted that the literature in political
science has amassed descriptive material on the diffusion of policy innova-
4A literature survey is given by Brueckner (2003).
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tions in federal systems, in particular among the American states.5 However,
analytical approaches focusing on the identification of strategic interaction
among local governments are largely missing in that literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the Michigan open
enrollment program and potential factors affecting policy preferences of dis-
tricts are described. Section 3 deals with the estimation approach. In section
4, estimation results are presented and discussed, and section 5 concludes.
2 Inter-district open enrollment as a local
policy innovation in Michigan
As mentioned above, the policy innovation under investigation in this pa-
per is inter-district public school choice, sometimes also called inter-district
open enrollment. Basically, it allows students to attend a public school in a
school district other than the district of residence. In the U.S., school choice
policies have been a much discussed topic of educational reform in recent
years. The significance of the inter-district version of school choice comes
from the fact that it will tend to increase competition for students between
districts.6 Michigan’s inter-district public school choice program has been
launched in 1996 by a state law saying that each school district shall deter-
mine whether or not it will accept applications for enrollment by nonresident
students for the next school year.7 Under the new law, districts were free to
enroll any applicant in the district’s schools provided that the student’s home
district belongs to the same Intermediate School District.8 School choice in
5For an early analysis on the diffusion of policy innovations in the US see Walker (1969).
A survey on related literature in political science is given by Berry and Berry (1999).
6See Hoxby (2000) and Hoxby (2003) for a discussion on the effects of competition among
public schools on school productivity.
7For details see Michigan Compiled Laws, Section 388.1705 (Act 300, 1996).
8ISDs are regional educational service agencies comprising several local school districts.
ISDs originally were created to provide school districts with services and programs too ex-
pensive or too extensive to be offered by districts individually. In 1997, Michigan had 554
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Michigan gained much of its significance as a policy innovation by the fact
that districts were not given the power to prevent resident students to en-
roll elsewhere. At the same time, competition for students was fuelled by
the fact that in its school finance scheme Michigan had shifted from local
property taxes to a per-student state guarantee in 1994. The minimum per-
student state aid was $ 4,200 for the school year 1994-95 and had increased
to $ 4,816 for the school year 1996-97.9 Districts loosing students under the
school choice regime would thus immediately suffer a significant decrease in
revenues. At the same time, the school choice program offered districts the
chance to attract students from elsewhere and thereby to raise their revenues.
Of course, school boards as local authorities in individual districts are
rather interested in the impact of school choice on the conditions at local
schools than in potential overall effects of increased competition on school
productivity. In the following, we will briefly discuss the factors which might
have affected the districts’ willingness to participate in inter-district open
enrollment.
First of all, as enrollment of non-resident students will increase revenues,
districts have a fiscal incentive to admit non-resident students at local schools.
Of course, this incentive should be stronger for districts experiencing fiscal
stress than for districts with abundant revenues. A reason for hesitation in
switching to a policy of open enrollment may be limited capacity in local
schools. In general, districts with crowded schools will be less willing to
allow for the enrollment of transfer students. Furthermore, crowded schools
are perceived as less attractive by potential transfer students and, from an ex-
ante perspective, decrease the probability that the district will be successful
in attracting non-resident students.
Furthermore, the racial composition of school districts as well as the in-
school districts and 57 ISDs.
9For details on the school finance reform in Michigan, see Michigan Department of Trea-
sury (2002).
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come of an average resident household may have an influence on preferences
towards open enrollment. Another factor influencing participation of districts
in public school choice may be the districts’ location relative to large cen-
tral cities. Traditionally, suburban school districts have been opposing the
idea of inter-district open enrollment (Ryan and Heise 2002). Given their
social and economic characteristics, suburban schools are, on average, better
than urban schools, and residents in suburban districts tend to perceive inter-
district transfers as a threat to the superior quality of local public schools.
More generally, the predisposition towards open enrollment may depend on
the district’s position with regard to some characteristic relative to its geo-
graphical neighbors. The point is that, due to transportation to more distant
schools being either unavailable or prohibitively costly, school districts will
be able to attract students only from nearby districts. The relative attrac-
tiveness of each district for non-resident students and the characteristics of
transfer students whose application for enrollment in local schools is antic-
ipated will therefore depend on the district’s characteristics relative to its
neighbors. To capture this, we construct an additional control variable, de-
scribing the districts’ relative position with respect to the share of minority
students. This variable is conveniently defined as the difference between the
district’s own share of minority students and the mean of this share for all
contiguous districts, weighted by district population. Finally, we will also
account for the possibility that smaller districts are in general more flexible
than larger districts in the adoption of policy innovations.
Based on the preceding discussion, we include as control variables in our
empirical specification two dummy variables, one for districts in large or
mid-size central cities (CITY ) and one for suburban school districts (SUB);
enrollment (ENR) as a measure for the districts’ size; the student-teacher
ratio (STR), measuring the capacity for enrollment of transfer students; the
share of minority students in local public schools (MST )10; the district’s rev-
10MST is defined as one minus the share of white non-Hispanic students.
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enue per student (REV ) as a measure for fiscal stress; the median household
income (MHI ); and the relative position in the share of minority students
(RMST ).
3 Modelling policy innovation among school
districts
As mentioned above, the Michigan open enrollment law requires each school
district in each year to announce whether in the following school year it
will admit non-resident students at local schools. This is a discrete choice
decision problem which is captured in an econometric model using a simple
latent variable framework. Suppose that the observable policy decision yit is
related to the latent predisposition towards the adoption of open enrollment,
y∗it, according to
yit = 1[y
∗
it > 0], i = 1, . . . , N (1)
where 1[·] is the indicator function. Suppose furthermore that i’s predispo-
sition towards the adoption of open enrollment in period t is a function of
lagged adoption decisions of other districts {yj, t−1}Nj 6=i, i’s lagged own decision
yi, t−1 and a vector of exogenous characteristics xit where the first element is
unity. A linear specification for the latent variable would then be
y∗it = φ
N∑
j 6=i
ωij yj, t−1 + λ yi, t−1 + xitβ + uit, (2)
where ωij is the weight assigned to district j by district i, φ, λ and β rep-
resent coefficients and uit is a well-behaved idiosyncratic error distributed
symmetrically about zero. The conditional probability that i adopts open
enrollment policies is
Pr
(
yit = 1 | {yj, t−1}Nj=1, xit
)
= Pr
(
y∗it > 0 | {yj, t−1}Nj=1, xit
)
. (3)
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With an appropriate assumption on the distribution of u, the parameters φ,
λ and β are identified and average partial effects can be estimated using stan-
dard maximum likelihood techniques. Of course, the parameter of primary
interest in this specification is φ. A non-zero value of φ would imply that the
attitude towards the adoption of open enrollment as a policy innovation in
any given district depends on lagged adoption decisions in other districts.
With respect to the latent variable model displayed in eq. (2), a number
of issues must be addressed. First of all, the question arises why strategic in-
teraction among districts should take the specific form assumed here. For in-
stance, in related empirical work drawing on Case (1992), spatial interactions
between jurisdictions in the adoption of policy innovations have been veri-
fied using an alternative model with y∗it depending on the contemporaneous
predisposition towards adoption in other districts (Rincke 2005a). The main
argument in favor of the specification in eq. (2) is that, as we will see, adop-
tion decisions are strongly serially correlated and, therefore, the lagged policy
of any given district is a good predictor for current policies. Hence, if the
true model is one in which districts choose their policies simultaneously and
where each district’s choice is a function of expected policies elsewhere, our
specification will nevertheless capture quite accurately how districts interact
with each other. Another attractive feature of the model is that using lagged
adoption decisions as independent variables in eq. (2) rules out problems of
reverse causation that might be present in other models. Since current own
policies cannot affect past policies in other districts, the direction of influence
among districts, should any such influence be present, is unambiguous.
A second issue is the choice of the weights ωij. In general, it is difficult to
define appropriate weights since no general criterion for discriminating be-
tween competing definitions is available. In our case, however, things should
be less complicated than in many other applications. First of all, given the
mere number of more than 550 school districts in Michigan, it seems reason-
able to assume that decision makers at the district level are able to track
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conditions for policymaking and actual decisions only in a tiny fraction of all
districts. Focusing attention on similarly situated districts will, for most dis-
tricts, not suffice in order to define a sufficiently small set of reference districts
suitable for a close tracking of policies in ‘neighboring’ districts. Thus, the es-
timation approach of Hautsch and Klotz (2003), where neighbors are defined
in an abstract social space, does not seem to be appropriate for the analysis
of policies in a large sample of local jurisdictions.11 Given these arguments, it
seems reasonable to define the weights in eq. (2) according to some measure
of geographical proximity. A straightforward way to do this is to define the
group of neighbors for each district as the set of contiguous districts. With
this definition, the average district has 5.4 neighbors. An alternative is to
define groups of neighbors according to the affiliation of districts to Interme-
diate School Districts (ISDs). As regional educational service agencies, ISDs
have substantial influence on local policies, and school district officials can
be expected to be much more familiar with general conditions as well as spe-
cific policies in school districts belonging to the same ISD. Furthermore, the
Michigan open enrollment law in its original formulation allowed transfers of
students only within the same ISD. Hence, with respect to open enrollment
policies, the ISD level was of particular importance for decision makers in
local school districts. Relying on affiliation to ISDs gives 12.0 neighbors for
the average district.
Section 4 presents results which have been derived using different weighting
schemes. Formally, in each scheme the impact of lagged policy decisions of
neighbors in eq. (2) takes the general form
φ
 N∑
j 6=i
dij wj
−1 N∑
j 6=i
dij wj yj, t−1 , (4)
where dij is an indicator taking value 1 if j belongs to the set of neighbors
of i and zero otherwise, and wj is a weight for district j among all potential
11Using spatial weights defined according to Hautsch and Klotz (2003), no evidence on
interaction among districts has been found.
9
neighbors of i. To construct different weighting schemes, the indicators dij
are either defined to select contiguous districts or districts in the same ISD,
whereas wj is either set to unity, assigning to all neighbors of i the same
potential impact on i’s decision, or wj is given by j’s population such that
larger neighbors have stronger influence than smaller neighbors. Combining
both definitions for the indicators dij with both definitions for wj gives four
different weighting schemes. Note that in all schemes the overall potential
influence of neighbors on any given district is normalized.
A potential problem in the identification of horizontal strategic interaction
among school districts that we have to address is the impact Intermediate
School Districts have on local school district policies. ISDs are higher level
authorities in the federal educational system of Michigan, and the vertical
impact of ISD policies on local school districts may well lead to spatial cor-
relation in the school districts’ behavior towards open enrollment. Suppose,
for instance, that ISDs engage in policy coordination among affiliated dis-
tricts,12 or that ISD officials have certain preferences towards inter-district
school choice and try to affect policies at the local level accordingly. Not
accounting for the effect of ISD policies on adoption decisions of local school
districts could then lead to false conclusions with respect to horizontal in-
teraction among districts. In section 4 results for estimations are reported
where the effect the affiliation to ISDs may have on district policies is con-
trolled by dummy variables for ISDs. Of course, it is not possible to identify
any neighborhood influence in these regressions with neighbors being defined
according to affiliation to ISDs.
A final point in the discussion of the estimation approach relates to the
possibility that the districts’ response to lagged decisions of neighbors sys-
tematically differs between adopters and non-adopters. More specifically, we
12Note that under Michigan law ISDs could run their own ISD-wide school choice programs.
Local school districts in these ISDs would then be exempt from the provisions of the statewide
program. See Michigan Compiled Laws, Section 388.1705b (effective since June 1997).
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will also estimate a model with the latent variable equation being
y∗it = φ1
N∑
j 6=i
ωij yi, t−1 yj, t−1+φ2
N∑
j 6=i
ωij (1−yi, t−1) yj, t−1+λ yi, t−1+xitβ+uit. (5)
For districts which have adopted open enrollment in t−1 the second term on
the right hand side of eq. (5) equals zero. Hence, φ1 measures the extent to
which neighbors’ lagged decisions affect current policies. If open enrollment
has not been adopted in t − 1, the first term equals zero, and φ2 measures
the neighborhood influence on current policies. A difference between φ1 and
φ2 would indicate that it depends on lagged own decisions how districts are
affected by policies in neighboring districts.
4 Estimation and results
The empirical analysis is based on data on 522 Unified School Districts in
Michigan, but most estimations reported in this section utilize the informa-
tion from only 504 districts.13 The analysis focuses on the behavior of school
districts in the first two years of the Michigan open enrollment program.
Since lagged policies are included in all specifications, the spatial interac-
tion among districts is identified using the cross-section of districts from the
second year of the program, 1997.
In the first year, 185 out of 504 districts in the sample allowed for enroll-
ment of non-resident students. In 1997, 59 districts joined and 14 districts
left the program. With 230 open enrollment districts, the participation rate
in 1997 was 45.6%.
13A minority of 30 Michigan school districts runs only elementary schools and is excluded
from the sample. Furthermore, inter-district school choice cannot be considered a relevant
policy in two Unified School Districts which are islands. To identify influential observations,
a linear probability model was estimated using the remaining 522 observations. Based on
the approach proposed by Krasker, Kuh, and Welsch (1983), 18 observations were removed.
This left 504 districts for the analysis.
11
Table 1: School choice in Michigan 1997, descriptive statistics
Participation in 1997
District characteristics All districts Yes No
Share of participating districts .370 .568 .204
in own ISD, previous year (.342) (.329) (.252)
Own decision in previous year .367 .743 .051
(.482) (.438) (.221)
Central city, CITY .077 .083 .073
(.267) (.276) (.261)
Suburb, SUB .327 .248 .394
(.470) (.433) (.490)
Enrollment, ENR 2.76 2.33 3.12
(3.28) (2.77) (3.63)
Student-teacher ratio, STR 14.9 14.7 15.2
(1.85) (1.94) (1.75)
Share of minority students, MST .088 .091 .085
(.125) (.128) (.123)
Revenues per student a, REV 7.11 7.01 7.20
(1.09) (.998) (1.16)
Median household income a, MHI 42.5 40.0 44.6
(11.1) (9.63) (11.8)
Relative position in share -.039 -.019 -.056
of minority students, RMST (.159) (.129) (.180)
Nob 504 230 274
Sources : Information on participation of districts is from Arsen, Plank,
and Sykes (1999); Information used to construct the dummies CITY
and SUB is from the Local Education Agency (School District) and
School Universe Survey Longitudinal Data Files of the National Cen-
ter for Education Statistics (NCES), Common Core of Data (CCD) at
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/ccddata.asp; Data on enrollment, minority stu-
dents, staff and revenues is from the K-12 database of the Michigan Depart-
ment of Education, Center for Educational Performance and Information
(CEPI) at www.michigan.gov/cepi. Data on median household income is
from the School District Demographic System of the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) at http://www.nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/.
a In thousands of dollars; Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables,
allowing for a first inspection of differences between participating and non-
participating districts. First of all, on average participating districts are
located in environments where participation is the rule rather than the ex-
ception, whereas for districts opting out it is the other way round: adopters
are located in ISDs where 57% of all other districts accept transfer students.
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For non-participating districts, this share is only 20%. The own lagged deci-
sion seems to have a strong influence on current decisions. 74% of participat-
ing districts have adopted open enrollment already in 1996, while only 5%
of the districts without open enrollment did participate in the previous year.
Among participating districts, the share of suburban school districts is signif-
icantly lower than among districts which do not accept non-resident students.
Participating districts are also smaller and have a lower student-teacher ratio
than non-adopters. Furthermore, adopters have lower revenues and a lower
median household income. Interestingly, adopters and non-adopters also dif-
fer in their relative position with respect to the share of minority students,
with the difference showing the expected sign. Non-participating districts on
average have a share of minority students which is 6 percentage points below
that of their immediate neighbors. This difference is significantly lower (in
absolute value) for districts accepting transfer students.
The first step in the analysis is to run two baseline regressions where we
completely ignore the potential impact of lagged own decisions and lagged
policies of neighbors. The baseline regressions are meant as a first, albeit
crude test whether the approach of estimating a discrete choice model for the
adoption of open enrollment policies with the given set of control variables
is meaningful at all. Table 2 reports the results of a simple probit and a
probit with dummy variables for ISDs as additional regressors. In the simple
probit model, four out of the eight explanatory variables show coefficients
significant at least at the 10% level. The model correctly predicts more than
62% of all decisions. The coefficients of the student-teacher ratio and the
revenue variable show the expected sign. Furthermore, the results suggest
that districts with lower median household income and with a higher share
of minority students relative to their immediate neighbors participate with
a higher probability. The estimation with ISD dummies has only 339 obser-
vations. The reason is that in 22 out of 57 ISDs all affiliated local school
districts either adopt open enrollment, or they all opt out of the program.
13
Table 2: Adoption of school choice - baseline regressions
Probit withSimple probit
ISD dummies a
Explanatory variables Coeff. Slopeb Coeff. Slopeb
Suburb, SUB .328 .122 .120 .033
(.270) (.374)
Central city, CITY .024 .009 .146 .041
(.163) (.257)
Enrollment, ENR -.029 -.011 -.012 -.003
(.024) (.030)
Student-teacher ratio, STR -.112 ?? -.042 -.157 ?? -.044
(.042) (.058)
Share of minority students, MST -.350 -.130 -.781 -.217
(.645) (.763)
Revenues per student, REV -.165 ?? -.061 -.287 ?? -.080
(.072) (.098)
Median household income, MHI -.012 ? -.004 -.013 -.004
(.007) (.011)
Relative position in share .954 ?? .356 1.45 ?? .405
of minority students, RMST (.475) (.569)
Nob 504 339
Log-likelihood -328.36 -167.41
Percent correctly predicted 62.3 78.5
Actual adoptions
Yes No Yes No
Yes 127 87 133 39Predicted adoptions
No 103 187 34 133
Standard errors in parentheses; aAdditional regressors: dummy variables for
Intermediate School Districts; bAverage of estimated individual changes in
probabilities; ?? Significant at the 5% level; ? Significant at the 10% level.
With dummy variables for ISDs, these observations have to be removed from
the sample in order to avoid the problem of complete separation. The results
for the probit with ISD dummies are similar to those of the simple probit,
even though the coefficient for the median household income is insignificant
and the average partial effects of the student-teacher ratio, revenues and the
relative position in the share of minority students are now somewhat higher in
absolute value. Furthermore, the model correctly predicts almost 78% of all
decisions. Taken together, the results of the baseline regressions suggest that
a number of important school district characteristics affecting the adoption
14
of open enrollment as a policy innovation have been identified.
We now turn to estimations of the model with dynamic spatial effects,
i.e. with lagged adoption decisions of neighbors as additional explanatory
variables. Table 3 displays four sets of results, corresponding to the dif-
ferent weighting schemes discussed in the previous section. The results for
all estimations suggest that there is positive neighborhood influence in the
adoption of open enrollment policies, and that the impact of lagged adoption
decisions of neighbors on current policies is substantial. A one percentage
point increase in the share of neighbors participating in the first year of the
school choice program increases the current probability of adoption by 0.18%
to 0.22%. This implies that a district with a share of innovating neighbors
one standard deviation above that of an otherwise identical reference dis-
trict is between 6.6% and 7.4% more likely to participate. As we expected
from the inspection of the descriptive statistics, the own lagged decision is a
strong predictor for current participation decisions. Districts which already
adopted open enrollment in 1996 are between 40.5% and 41.8% more likely
to allow for the transfer of non-residents in 1997 than districts which did not
participate in the previous year. In addition, the student-teacher ratio and
the revenues per student affect district policies. An additional student per
teacher decreases the probability of adoption by 4.0%, while $ 1,000 of ad-
ditional revenues per student decrease the participation probability by 3.5%
to 4.1%. The appropriateness of the model with dynamic spatial effects to
explain the districts decisions whether to adopt open enrollment policies is
underscored by the fact that about 85% of all decisions are correctly pre-
dicted. Furthermore, the choice of the weighting scheme seems to have little
impact on the results. This makes us confident that the ad-hoc definition of
spatial weights is not a serious problem for the empirical analysis of horizon-
tal interactions among districts as long as the weights select a small number
of neighbors based on some measure of geographical proximity.
As the next step in the analysis, a series of smaller models is estimated: a
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Table 4: Adoption of school choice - probit estimates of smaller models
Explanatory variables Coeff. Slopea Coeff. Slopea Coeff. Slopea
Neighbors’ impact b, φ - - .944 ?? .202 - -
(.259)
Own decision in 2.35 ?? .493 2.04 ?? .438 2.33 ?? .516
previous year, λ (.166) (.176) (.159)
Central city, CITY .175 .037
(.356)
Suburb, SUB .161 .034
(.202)
Enrollment, ENR -.014 -.003
(.031)
Student-teacher -.182?? -.038
ratio, STR (.053)
Share of minority -.469 -.098
students, MST (.848)
Revenues per -.165? -.035
student, REV (.090)
Median household -.006 -.001
income, MHI (.009)
Rel. pos. in share .830 .174
of min. stud., RMST (.614)
Log-likelihood -191.02 -195.62 -202.34
Percent correctly pred. 85.9 85.5 85.5
Actual adoptions
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Yes 173 14 171 14 171 14Predicted adoptions
No 57 260 59 260 59 260
Nob=504; Standard errors in parentheses; a Sample average of estimated indi-
vidual changes in probabilities; b Definition of neighbors: contiguous districts,
unweighted; ?? Significant at the 5% level; ? Significant at the 10% level.
model without the dynamic spatial effect, a model without explanatory vari-
ables other than lagged decisions, and a model predicting current adoption
decisions only from lagged own policies. The purpose of estimating these
models is to provide additional evidence on the significance of the neighbor-
hood influence on actual policies and the overall fit of the model. The results
are displayed in Table 4. The first set of results is for the model with all
control variables present but without the dynamic spatial effect. It provides
us with the interesting insight that not accounting for the impact of lagged
decisions of neighbors on current adoption decisions results in the effects of
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horizontal interaction among districts being attributed to the district’s own
lagged decision. While the average partial effects for the student-teacher ratio
and revenues per student are virtually unchanged, the effect of participation
in the previous year on the probability of current participation is now esti-
mated to be about 8% higher than in the full model. In addition, likelihood
ratio tests reveal that the increase in the log-likelihood from -191.0 to the
levels achieved with the full model (-183.8 to -182.0) is highly significant.
Thus, including the neighborhood influence improves the overall fit of the
model while removing a strong upward bias from the estimate of the partial
effect of lagged own decisions.
The second set of results from Table 4 can be used for a test whether the
control variables used in the simple baseline probit estimation do have any
effect on the overall fit of the model once the impact of lagged policies is
taken into account. Again, a likelihood ratio test reveals that the difference
in the log-likelihood compared to the full model is highly significant. Hence,
even though the model without explanatory variables other than lagged pol-
icy decisions has the same power in predicting actual policies and the partial
effects for the lagged policy variables are of similar size as in the full model,
not accounting for the effects of the additional control variables removes a sig-
nificant amount of information from the system. Finally, dropping the spatial
effect from the model and predicting current decisions only from lagged own
policies again involves a strong upward bias in the partial effect of the lagged
own policy. Furthermore, the log-likelihood is again significantly lowered. As
a last observation from Table 4, note that the merit of the full model of being
able to correctly predict about 85% of all adoption decisions is due to the
lagged own decision as the single most powerful predictor of actual adoption
decisions.
As mentioned in section 3, a potential problem in the identification of
horizontal strategic interaction among school districts is that policies of local
school districts are affected by Intermediate School District authorities. To
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Table 5: Adoption of school choice - probit estimates with ISD dummies
Contiguous distr., Contiguous distr.,Definition of neighbors:
unweighted weighted by pop.
Explanatory variables Coeff. Slopea Coeff. Slopea
Neighbors’ impact, φ 1.21 ?? .202 .955 ? .160
(.579) (.509)
Own decision in previous year, λ 2.57 ?? .429 2.55 ?? .427
(.279) (.276)
Suburb, SUB -.038 -.006 -.060 -.010
(.487) (.483)
Central city, CITY .199 .033 .164 .028
(.317) (.318)
Enrollment, ENR .024 .004 .023 .004
(.042) (.041)
Student-teacher ratio, STR -.254?? -.042 -.246?? -.041
(.075) (.074)
Share of minority students, MST -1.28 -.213 -1.32 -.221
(.970) (.971)
Revenues per student, REV -.281?? -.047 -.273?? -.046
(.120) (.120)
Median household income, MHI -.006 -.001 -.007 -.001
(.015) (.015)
Relative position in share 1.20 .200 1.17 .196
of minority students, RMST (.769) (.780)
Log-likelihood -101.99 -102.49
Percent correctly pred. 87.3 87.6
Actual adoptions
Yes No Yes No
Yes 148 24 148 23Predicted adoptions
No 19 148 19 149
Nob=339; Standard errors in parentheses. Additional regressors: dummy
variables for Intermediate School Districts; a Sample average of estimated in-
dividual changes in probabilities; ?? Significant at the 5% level; ? Significant
at the 10% level.
put it shortly, it could be that the estimated positive coefficient of lagged
policies of neighbors is not due to horizontal interaction among local school
districts but due to the impact of ISDs on affiliated districts. Table 5 reports
results of estimations where the effect of vertical interactions in the educa-
tional system on district policies is controlled by dummy variables for ISDs.
The first set of results reports parameter estimates and partial effects with
neighbors’ lagged policies being defined as the unweighted share of adopters
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among contiguous districts. All partial effects are of similar size as in the
model without ISD dummies, although the negative effect of revenues per
student is now somewhat more pronounced. Most importantly, the impact
of lagged adoption decisions of neighbors is highly significant, with a one
percentage point increase in the share of participating neighbors increasing
the current probability of adoption by 0.20%. An increase in the share of
innovating neighbors by one standard deviation makes current adoption of
open enrollment 6% more likely. If neighbors’ lagged policies enter the model
as the share of adopters among contiguous districts weighted by population,
the partial effect is somewhat reduced and the coefficient is significant only at
the 10% level. Note, however, that to estimate the model with ISD dummies
the sample has to be reduced by 165 observations in order to avoid com-
plete separation, and that 34 dummy variables are included in the model as
additional regressors. Taken together, the results from Table 5 confirm the
key insights derived so far. Most importantly, the positive partial effect of
lagged policies of neighbors on the participation probability of school districts
does not seem to be driven by Intermediate School Districts policies towards
affiliated districts.
We now turn to asymmetric responses. Table 6 reports results for the
model with the districts’ predisposition towards adoption of open enrollment
given by eq. (5). In the interest of brevity, results for only two weighting
schemes are displayed. With neighbors defined as contiguous districts, the
hypothesis that previous-year adopters’ choice of current policies is not af-
fected by lagged decisions of neighbors cannot be rejected at the 10% signif-
icance level. At the same time, the coefficient φ2 is highly significant. The
partial effect indicates that previous-year non-adopters are 0.23% more likely
to participate in open enrollment if the share of previous-year adopters among
neighbors is increased by one percentage point. With neighbors defined as
districts in the same ISD (weighted by population), the impact of lagged poli-
cies of neighbors on previous-year adopters is weakly significant. The results
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Table 6: Adoption of school choice - probit estimates with asymmetric responses
Contiguous distr., Districts in same ISD,Definition of neighbors:
unweighted weighted by pop.
Explanatory variables Coeff. Slopea Coeff. Slopea
Neighbors’ impact on .705 .141 .763 ? .153
previous-year adopters, φ1 (.466) (.408)
Neighbors’ impact on 1.17 ?? .234 .992 ?? .199
previous-year non-adopters, φ2 (.327) (.286)
Own decision in previous year, λ 2.27 ?? .456 2.15 ?? .431
(.308) (.278)
Suburb, SUB .304 .061 .205 .041
(.373) (.367)
Central city, CITY .228 .046 .228 .046
(.204) (.205)
Enrollment, ENR -.011 -.002 -.011 -.002
(.031) (.031)
Student-teacher ratio, STR -.201?? -.040 -.198?? -.040
(.054) (.054)
Share of minority students, MST -.609 -.122 -.419 -.084
(.883) (.876)
Revenues per student, REV -.184?? -.037 -.199?? -.040
(.092) (.092)
Median household income, MHI -.006 -.001 -.003 -.001
(.009) (.009)
Relative position in share .893 .179 .931 .187
of minority students, RMST (.641) (.634)
Log-likelihood -183.35 -183.30
Percent correctly pred. 85.7 84.9
Actual adoptions
Yes No Yes No
Yes 176 18 175 21Predicted adoptions
No 54 256 55 253
Nob=504; Standard errors in parentheses; a Sample average of estimated indi-
vidual changes in probabilities; ?? Significant at the 5% level; ? Significant at
the 10% level.
suggest that a one percentage point increase in the share of innovating neigh-
bors increases the probability of participation among previous-year adopters
by 0.15%, while raising the participation probability among previous-year
non-adopters by 0.20%. Note, however, that the difference in the estimates
for φ1 and φ2 is not significant at conventional levels. Thus, while the neigh-
borhood influence on previous-year non-adopters is highly significant across
21
all weighting schemes14, the evidence on previous-year adopters being affected
by lagged policies of neighbors is mixed.
Taken together, these results suggest that school districts which did not
participate in the first year of Michigan’s inter-district school choice program
were ‘pulled’ to participation in the second year by previous-year adopters
in their geographical environment. First-year adopters seem to have been
confirmed in their choice by participation of neighbors, but this effect is not
robust across the various specifications for spatial weights.
5 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the participation of school districts in the early
phase of Michigan’s public school choice program launched in 1996. To-
gether with a school finance scheme paying school districts a fixed amount of
state aid per student, the program did increase competition between school
districts. Participation of school districts in the program can therefore be
considered an important policy innovation in a decentralized public sector.
The empirical results presented in this paper show that in their attitude
towards the adoption of school choice, the Michigan school districts have
been heavily affected by lagged adoption decisions of neighboring districts.
Across various specifications, a one percentage point increase in the share of
previous-year adopters among neighbors is estimated to increase the current
probability of adoption by about 0.2%. There is also evidence for asymmetric
responses among districts, with non-adopters being ‘pulled’ to participation
by previous-year adopters in their geographical environment. Furthermore,
the paper accounts for the impact of Intermediate School Districts as higher
level authorities in the educational system on school district policies. This is
important, since not accounting for this impact could lead to false conclusions
14Results for the other weighting schemes closely resemble those displayed as the second
specification in Table 6.
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on the existence of neighborhood influence among districts. Taken together,
the evidence provided in this paper suggests that in the analysis of the diffu-
sion of policy innovations among local jurisdictions it is crucial to take into
account strategic interaction between the jurisdictions’ governments.
Evidence on neighborhood influence among local jurisdictions clearly sup-
ports the view that in a decentralized public sector jurisdictions interact with
each other in the choice of policy instruments. Moreover, with respect to the
adoption of policy innovations, evidence on positive neighborhood influence
suggests that in federal systems the diffusion of new political technologies
is stimulated by horizontal interactions between jurisdictions, whereas the
hypothesis that local policy innovation is hampered by an incentive for de-
cision makers to free-ride on experimentation activities in other jurisdictions
is clearly rejected. The analysis provided in this paper thus extends and
substantiates the results derived in Rincke (2005a).
Still, there are many open questions with respect to decentralized decision
making and policy experimenting. For instance, this paper focuses on the
early phase of experimentation with a new policy among local jurisdictions.
In future empirical work, it will certainly be worthwhile to investigate the
diffusion of policy innovations in panels of local jurisdictions with stronger
emphasis on long-run effects of horizontal interactions.
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